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Concession Bidding Rules and Investment Time Flexibility 
 
Summary 
We study the competition to operate an infrastructure service by developing a model 
where firms report a two-dimensional sealed bid: the price to consumers and the 
concession fee paid to the government. Two alternative bidding rules are considered in 
this paper. One rule consists of awarding the exclusive right of exercise to the firm that 
reports the lowest price. The other consists of granting the franchise to the bidder 
offering the highest fee. We compare the outcome of these rules with reference to two 
alternative concession arrangements. The former imposes the obligation to immediately 
undertake the investment required to roll-out the service. The latter allows the winning 
bidder to optimally decide the investment time. The focus is on the effect of bidding 
rules and managerial flexibility on expected social welfare. We find that the two bidding 
rules provide the same outcome only when the contract restricts the autonomy of the 
franchisee, and we identify the conditions under which time flexibility can provide a 
higher social value. 
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One way of bringing competitive forces into natural monopoly industries is
to delineate a monopoly franchise and auction it o⁄ to the bidder o⁄ering
the best proposal (Desmetz, 1968; Dnes, 1995; Klein and Gray, 1997).
There are a wide variety of "concessions"1and di⁄erent types of compet-
itive bidding rules. As far as concession arrangements are concerned, one
key di⁄erence is whether the conceding authority imposes speci￿c obliga-
tions regarding the means to be used by the operator, namely the required
investment.2 At one extreme, the government can eliminate almost all scope
for discretion, by imposing investment plans which rule out any time ￿ exi-
bility. At the other, contracts can be designed so as to leave a large degree
of autonomy to the winning bidder, by simply assigning the right, as distinct
from the obligation, to supply the market.
Another key issue relates to the bid evaluation process, namely which
speci￿cations to include for the technical and ￿nancial proposals.3 As far as
the ￿nancial o⁄ers are concerned, when the concession does not involve sale
of existing assets, awarding authorities frequently base the bidding on the
highest (one-time or annual) fee paid to the government, or on the lowest
price charged to consumers (World Bank, 1998).
The debate about concession design and award procedures is not new.
For example, Alfred Marshall argued that "[...] the competition for the fran-
chise shall turn on the price or the quality, or both, of the services or the
goods, rather than on the annual sum paid for the lease"4. However, the
modern literature on franchise bidding has not explored in depth the e⁄ects
1Throughout the paper we use the term concession broadly to refer to "any arrangement
in which a ￿rm obtains from the government the right to provide a particular service under
conditions of signi￿cant market power" (World Bank, 1998, p.10).
2"In 1993 Argentina￿ s national freight rail network was partitioned and concessioned
under 30-year contracts. As part of the concession agreements, winning bidders agreed to
invest about $1.2 billion in the rail network over 15 years [...] Despite substantial e¢ ciency
gain in service, however, tra¢ c levels have fallen short of expectations, reaching only 60
to 70 percent of projected tra¢ c [...] Given the lower-than-expected tra¢ c levels, the
investment amounts agreed in the contracts are likely to be unnecessary and uneconomic"
(World Bank, 1998, p.75).
3Conceding authorities often adopt a two-stage process whereby technical proposals are
evaluated before proceeding to the ￿nancial o⁄ers. The winning bidder is then selected
on the basis of the best ￿nancial proposal from among those who passed the technical
evaluation (World Bank, 1998).
4Quoted in Ekelund and Hebert (1981), p.471.
2of alternative bidding rules, and the relationship between the outcome of the
award process and concession arrangements.
Our model is novel in that it treats the choice both of bidding rules
and of concession design. The purpose is twofold. First, we analyze the
outcome of the above-mentioned bidding rules ("highest concession fee" vs
"lowest price"), with reference to two alternative concession arrangements.
The former imposes the obligation to immediately undertake the investment
required to roll-out the service. The latter involves investment time ￿ exi-
bility, by simply assigning the right to supply the market. Since the two
bidding rules involve di⁄erent outcomes when the contract does not restrict
the autonomy of the franchisee, the second issue addressed in the paper is,
Which combination (bidding method and concession arrangement) performs
best in terms of expected social welfare?
While this paper focuses on concession contracts, our analysis is related
to the literature on procurement, in particular to the branch of the literature
which considers the question of how to include quality other than sale price in
the procurement process (La⁄ont and Tirole, 1987; Che, 1993). In particular,
Che (1993) shows that the optimal buying mechanism distorts the quality
provided by the suppliers downwards relative to the ￿rst best levels. In
other words, the buyer, acting as if he does not care about the quality,
may reduce the dispersion between suppliers and thus increase the level of
procurement competition. Hence, if we interpret the construction time as
the procured project quality (Herbesman et al., 1995), Che￿ s result implies
that the government may bene￿t from a reduced sale price in exchange for a
project completion delay.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, our ￿ndings
suggest that concessioning an infrastructure service without imposing the
obligation to immediately supply the market (i.e. acting as if "quality" does
not matter) does not increase per se the level of competition. For instance, if
such a contract is awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the highest concession fee,
￿rms will not exploit the delay option, and will submit the same bids as those
they would have reported to acquire a contract which imposes the obligation
to immediately roll-out the service. Second, similarly to Che (1993), we
￿nd that a contract which does not impose such an obligation may prove to
be welfare-improving, provided the franchise is awarded to the bidder that
reports the lowest tari⁄.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
model and describes the concession value. Section 3 looks at the outcome of
3the two bidding rules. Section 4 focuses on the e⁄ect of bidding rules and
concession arrangements on expected social welfare. Section 5 concludes and
the Appendix contains the proofs omitted in the text.
2 The concession value
Consider a natural monopoly industry facing demand uncertainty which is
beyond the supplier￿ s control. To supply the market, the operator must
a⁄ord capital costs, without being able to exercise any degree of discretion
with respect to the type of investment to be undertaken and product quality.5
The standardized service under consideration can be operated only by
acquiring an exclusive right of exercise auctioned o⁄ by a public authority
(hereafter "the government"). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
franchise term is su¢ ciently long to be approximated by in￿nite.6 Depending
on the auction formats (Section 3), the franchise will be awarded to the bidder
reporting the lowest price to consumers, or to the ￿rm o⁄ering the highest
up-front payment (concession fee) to the government.
Before focussing on the bidding rules, let￿ s describe the value of the con-
cession, by taking the price as given and by ignoring the fee. We make the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1 The new infrastructure can be built instantly, at a cost I.
The investment is sunk, it can neither be changed, nor temporarily
stopped, nor shut down. Operating and maintenance costs are com-
paratively small and set to zero.
Assumption 2 The price of the service (p) reported by the winning bidder
is constant over the franchise term.
Assumption 3 At any time t ￿ 0 there is a mass yt of identical consumers,
each of whom has an inelastic demand for one unit of the service up to
some reservation price pmax.
5An example is provided by toll roads. Demand for a highway is largely beyond the
franchise holder, tra¢ c forecasts are notoriously imprecise, and it is di¢ cult to make
accurate tra¢ c predictions especially in the long term (Engel, Fisher, and Galetovic,
2001). Moreover, the service is fairly standard, and there is a limited scope for creativity
on the part of an operator.
6For the e⁄ect of concession length on the concession value see Engel, Fischer and
Galetovic (2001) and D￿ Alpaos, Dosi and Moretto (2006).
4Assumption 4 The timing of the demand is as follows. Current demand
(t = 0) is y0; but at t = 1 it may either rise to (1+u)y0 with probability
q , or decrease to (1￿d)y0 with probability 1￿q (u > 0 and 0 < d < 1):
% y
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1 = (1 ￿ d)y0 with probability 1 ￿ q
From t > 1; the demand will rise (decrease) at the constant rate u (d).
By assumptions 1-4, we ￿rst derive the concession value at t = 0 when
the franchisee must immediately operate the service. Since the ￿ ow of pro￿ts
that the ￿rm will receive once the investment is undertaken is pyt for all
t ￿ 0; the discounted value of pro￿t ￿ ows from time 1 onward, evaluated













￿+d; with probability 1 ￿ q respectively, where ￿ > u is
the constant discount rate.
Lemma 1 The expected Net Present Value at t = 0 is :
NPV















Proof. See Appendix A
In (1), ~ pK0 represents the minimal discounted expected total cash ￿ ow
for which the concession has a positive value.
Consider now the case where the winning bidder is allowed to keep open
the option to invest for one period. In this case, the conditon NPV 0 > 0 is
no longer su¢ cient for immediately building the new infrastructure, since it
does not account for the franchisee￿ s ability to react to unfavorable market
conditions (e.g. tra¢ c levels falling short of expectations).
Since in our setting a period is su¢ cient for obtaining information on the
investment pro￿tability, the decision to wait is economically signi￿cant only
if operating the service becomes pro￿table under the upward realization of
the demand level (y
+
1 ). From now on we restrict the analysis only to this





￿￿u (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
5Lemma 2 The expected Net Present Value at t = 1 as of today is:
NPV
1 = (p ￿ ~ p)K0 + (^ p ￿ p)K1 (2)
where:
^ p ￿











Proof. See Appendix B
By putting together (1) and (2), we get the concession value, which ac-
counts for how much the option to delay the investment is worth.
Proposition 1 For any given p, the concession value is:






￿ (p ￿ ~ p)K0 + max[(^ p ￿ p)K1;0]
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 1 and 2.
The second term on the r.h.s. of (3) represents the option value embedded
in a contract which does not impose the obligation to immediately a⁄ord
sunk capital costs. Since K0 ￿K1 > 0, by de￿ning ￿ p ￿ ￿~ p+(1￿￿)^ p; where
￿ ￿
K0
K0￿K1 > 1 and (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
K1
K0￿K1 < 0;7 equation (3) can be rewritten
as follows:
V (p) = max[(p ￿ ~ p)K0;(p ￿ ￿ p)(K0 ￿ K1)]: (4)














which ensures that 0 < ￿ p < ~ p < ^ p , and provides the following optimal
investment rule (See Figure 1):
if p > ^ p it is optimal to invest at t = 0
if ￿ p < p < ^ p it is optimal to invest at t = 1
if p < ￿ p it is never optimal to invest.




6Figure 1: The NPV with time ￿ exibility
73 Auction formats and concession design
A ￿rm can operate the service only after submitting a two-dimensional suc-
cessful bid. In particular, each ￿rm must report the price at which it will
commit itself to supply the market (p), and the up-front (t = 0) payment to
the government (R). Two alternative sealed-auction formats are considered
in this paper:
￿ The concession is awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the lowest price.
Should two or more ￿rms report the same tari⁄, the franchise will be
awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the highest fee (LPHF auction format).
￿ The concession is awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the highest fee. Should
two or more ￿rms report the same payment, the franchise will be
awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the lowest price (HFLP auction for-
mat).
The above formats allow the government to break a tie voluntarily, by
awarding the concession to the ￿rm that reports the highest fee (LPHF for-
mat) or the lowest price (HFLP format).8
We analyze the e⁄ects of these bidding rules by considering two alterna-
tive contracts:
￿ The franchisee is not allowed to delay the investment, i.e. the service
must be operated at t = 0 (Case 1).
￿ The franchisee is allowed to keep the option to operate the service alive
for one period (Case 2).
We conclude the model set-up by adding the following assumptions:
Assumption 6 There are N competing ￿rms.
Assumption 7 Each bidder i (i = 1;2;:::N) observes y0 and the multi-
plicative parameters (u;d), knows the distribution (q;1 ￿ q) and the
realization of the investment cost Ii;and only knows that Ij; j 6= i are
independent random variables, with the same absolutely continuous
8If there are more ￿rms that submit the same two-dimensional bid (p;R), then a random
drawing determines the winner.
8distribution G; with positive density g over the interval I = [Il;Iu]
￿ R. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that capital costs are uni-
formly distributed on I with Il = 0.9
Assumption 8 pmax ￿ ~ pu ￿ Iu
K0, i.e. the consumers￿reservation price is such
that even the most ine¢ cient ￿rm would be interested in operating the
service.
Assumption 9 Bidders are not subject to any liquidity or budget con-
straint, so that each ￿rm i has su¢ cient resources to pay the up-front
fee after winning the auction.
Assumption 10 The investment time is veri￿able by the government and
contract terms cannot be renegotiated.
Finally, all aspects of the bidding situation are known to the government
except for the investment costs Ii (i = 1;2;:::N) known only by each ￿rm
itself.
3.1 Case 1
Consider the outcome of the two auction formats when the government design
the concession so as to impose the obligation to immediately undertake the
investment.
Since bidders will play so as to avoid being involved in ties with a positive
probability, under the LPHF format the ￿rms￿optimal strategy is to choose
￿rst the lowest price that maximizes their probability of winning and then,
conditional on this tari⁄, report the highest fee. This is indeed an application
of the invariance result established by Jackson and Swinkels (2004) which
states that if a "strategy pro￿le forms an equilibrium for one omniscient
tie-breaking rule, it remains an equilibrium for any other trade-maximizing
omniscient tie-breaking rule" (p.2). In other words, how bidders behave
in the event of a tie and the tie-breaking then used are irrelevant for the
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.10
9None of the results depend on the assumption that G(I) is a uniform distribution as
long as I +
G(I)
g(I) is a monotone increasing function.
10Jackson and Swinkels￿ s approach is to show that an equilibrium exists in an auxiliary
game in which tie-breaking is endogenously chosen and then to show that the sharing
rule is, in fact, irrelevant. See also Simon and Zame (1990) for a full formal analysis of
9According to the invariance result, the bidders￿pricing problem reduces to
a Bertrand game where each ￿rm picks up the lowest price p that maximizes











Further, as the ￿rm reporting the lowest price is the one with the highest
NPV 0, it will minimize the probability of loosing by o⁄ering the highest fee.





















The equilibrium strategy for the LPHF format is summarized in the fol-
lowing Lemma.
Lemma 3 When the concessionaire is not allowed to delay the investment,
the LPHF auction involves the following unique symmetric equilibrium strat-
egy rules:























u ￿ ~ pi)K0
￿
(8)
Proof. See Appendix C
Going back to the de￿nition of NPV 0, since by assumption 7 the thresh-
old levels ~ pi are distributed uniformly within the support ￿ P= [0; ~ pu]; equa-
tion (7) implies that also NPV 0
i are uniformly distributed over the interval
[0;NPV 0
u ], with interim pro￿ts positive for all types but the weakest ￿rm,
which never wins and whose NPV 0
l is equal to zero even if it does win.
By substituting back (7) in the NPV 0
i , (1) can be rewritten as a function







u ￿ p(~ pi))K0
endogenous sharing rule in discontinuous games. In the spirit of Simon and Zame we can
think of the LPHF auction format as a two-stage game where bidders choose the price
in the ￿rst stage and then the fee in the second stage in order to prevent tie (the reverse
holds for the HFLP format).
10In other words, the bidder reporting the lowest price is indeed the one with
the highest NPV 0. Then, besides the fact that the concession is awarded
to the bidder that reports the lowest tari⁄, it is a dominant strategy for all
￿rms to o⁄er the highest fee in order not to increase the rivals￿probability
of winning.
The same line of reasoning applies for the HFLP format.
Proposition 2 When the concessionaire is not allowed to delay the invest-
ment, the two auction formats involve the same outcome: the concession will
be awarded to the most e¢ cient ￿rm which will report the two-dimensional
bid (p;R0) de￿ned by (7) and (8).
Proof. See Appendix D.
The above result is not surprising. In fact, as long as the government
imposes the obligation to immediately invest, the same outcome can be repli-
cated by a third auction format, where the government selects the winning
bidder according to a scoring rule (a ￿rst-score auction). More speci￿cally
let￿ s assume that the government is committed to awarding the franchise to






i ￿ ￿(pi) (9)
where ￿(pi) ￿
R pi
0 (N ￿ 1)
(x￿p￿1(x))
(~ pu￿x) K0dx and p(:) is the optimal pricing rule
de￿ned as in (7). Since 1
N￿1(x￿p￿1(x))K0 is the NPV 0 evaluated under the
optimal price of the service, the term ￿(pi) is increasing in pi; and the score
increases as the fee increases and/or the price reduces.
Proposition 3 A unique symmetric equilibrium of the ￿rst-score auction is
one in which each ￿rm o⁄ers the two-dimensional bid (pi;R0) de￿ned by (7)
and (8).
Proof. See Appendix E
Similarly to Che (1993), we ￿nd that the scoring rule (9) involves system-
atic distortion against the concession fee. In other words, since in order to
win the auction the bidders must compete both in the price and in the fee,
an optimal scoring rule should reduce the fee below the level that the ￿rm








0(pi; ~ pi) ￿ ￿(pi)
￿
(10)
11the problem can be seen as one in which each ￿rm, indexed by its adjusted
expected project value s0
















or substituting (10) and (9)
￿
NPV














which is equivalent to (6).
3.2 Case 2
In the previous section we have shown that when the contract imposes the
obligation to immediately operate the service, the two auction formats involve
identical outcomes in terms of price to consumers and concession fee. Does
this equivalence still hold when the franchisee is allowed to postpone the
investment?
We begin by identifying the equilibrium strategy under the LPHF auc-
tion. As in section 3.1, by the Jackson and Swinkels￿invariance result, bid-
ders￿optimal strategy is to choose ￿rst the lowest price and then report the
fee. The ￿rms￿pricing problem is still a Bertrand game where the project
value to be maximized is now given by V (pi) = max[NPV 0;NPV 1]. In other
words, each bidder selects two prices contingent to the investment time, and
reports the one that maximizes the probability of winning the auction. As
the ￿rm reporting the lowest tari⁄ is also the one with the highest V (pi),
it will minimizes the probability of being involved in a tie by reporting the
highest fee.
The equilibrium strategy for the LPHF auction is summarized in the
following Lemma.
Lemma 4 When the concessionaire is allowed to delay the investment, the
LPHF format involves the following unique symmetric equilibrium strategy
rules:























u ￿ ￿ pi)(K0 ￿ K1)
￿
(12)
12Proof. See Appendix F
By direct inspection of (7) and (11), it is easy to show that:






i; for all i (14)
Disequality (13) implies that competing by maximizing NPV 1
i is a dom-
inant strategy when the price plays a key role in winning the auction, as
occurs under the LPHF format. For instance, by exploiting the time ￿ ex-
ibility, bidders are able to submit a price (p(￿ pi)) lower than the one they
would be able to announce if they adopted NPV 0
i as a reference, as occurs
when agents compete to acquire a contract which transfers all risks to the
concessionaire, by ruling out time ￿ exibility.
By contrast, (14) suggests that bidders will not ￿nd it pro￿table to ex-
ploit time ￿ exibility when the concession fee plays a key role in the auction
(HFLP). For instance, by referring to NPV 0
i , bidders will report a fee (R0
i)
higher than the payment they would have reported if they referred to NPV 1
i .
Proposition 4 When the concessionaire is allowed to delay the investment,
the two auction formats involve di⁄erent outcomes:
￿ Under HFLP the concession will be awarded to the most e¢ cient ￿rm
that reports the two-dimensional bid (p(~ pi);R0
i)
￿ Under LPHF the concession will be awarded to the most e¢ cient ￿rm
that reports the two-dimensional bid (p(￿ pi);R1
i)
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 3 and 4
4 Welfare comparison
4.1 The welfare function
We found that the two auction formats involve the same outcome in terms of
price to consumers and concession fee when the contract rules out investment
time ￿ exibility. Moreover, this outcome is equal to the one which would
13emerge if the government awarded a contract which does not impose the
obligation to immediately operate the service by using the HFLP format.
Consequently, the government￿ s choice reduces to the following alternatives:
i) impose the obligation to invest immediately (in this case the bidding rule
is irrelevant), ii) allow the winning bidder to delay the investment, awarding
the concession by using the LPHF format.
In order to provide a decision rule, we assume that from the government￿ s
point of view a euro in the pocket of consumers and a euro in the hand of
a public authority are equally valuable, and that the objective function does
not include the winning bidder￿ s net pro￿ts: 11
W = E(S) + E(R)
where E(S) and E(R) are the expected discounted consumer surplus and the
expected government￿ s revenue respectively. In particular, for the former,
we need to distinguish between the consumer surplus if the concessionaire
operates the service at t = 0 (S0) from the consumer surplus if the ￿rm






















where S1 is evaluated at t = 1 as of today and only for y
+
t .
The following Lemma gives the values of the consumer surplus and the
government￿ s revenue under the two auction formats with and without time
￿ exibility.
Lemma 5 i) LPHF (without investment time ￿exibility) and HFLP (with





















11Since the fee is a constant fraction of the concession value, in qualitative terms the
results of the comparative welfare analysis would not change if the welfare were de￿ned
as the sum of the consumer surplus and the (￿rm￿ s) project value.
14ii) LPHF (with investment time ￿exibility) provides the following expected




















Proof. See Appendix G























Thus, investment time ￿ exibility, by inducing the bidders to reduce the price,
raises the consumer surplus but has a detrimental e⁄ect on the government￿ s















we get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 i) If ￿W 1;0 > 0, a contract which allows the concessionaire
to optimally decide the investment timing involves the highest expected welfare
value, provided the franchise is awarded according to the LPHF bidding rule.
ii) If ￿W 1;0 < 0, investment time ￿exibility does not provide any higher
welfare value.
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 5.
The second part of the proposition deserves some comments. Since ￿W 1;0 <
0 means that allowing the winner bidder to decide the investment time does
not increase the expected welfare value, from the government￿ s point of view,
imposing the obligation to invest immediately or allowing the franchise holder
to decide when to roll-out the service becomes irrelevant. However, whereas
in the former case the overall welfare value is not a⁄ected by the bidding rule,
in the latter case it becomes more socially pro￿table to award the concession
through the HFLP format.
154.2 Comparative statics analysis
Comparative statics analysis provides insights into the e⁄ect of some key pa-
rameters upon the payo⁄of alternative concession arrangements and bidding
rules. In particular, let￿ s consider how ￿W 1;0 is a⁄ected by demand volatility









@Iu > 0 (18)
The interpretation of (16) is straightforward if we refer to the Real Option
Theory. For instance, an increase in demand volatility makes the option of
waiting for new information before a⁄ording sunk costs more valuable; this, in
turn, increases the value of a contract which does not impose the obligation to
immediately invest. Under the LPHF format, bidders will exploit this option
value by further reducing the price. This involves an increase in consumer
surplus which more than compensates for the fall in expected government
revenue.
As for the number of competitors, an increase in N tends to make a ￿ ex-
ible contract and, consequently, the LPHF format more socially appealing.
We get a similar result when the upper boundary of the investment cost
(Iu) increases. This is because the LPHF format allows a larger number of
ine¢ cient ￿rms to report relatively low prices which still assure a positive
expected net present value. In e⁄ect, since the upper boundary Iu plays
the role of "reserve price", regardless of the auction format, an increase in
Iu, although it reduces the government revenue, involves an increase in the
consumer surplus. However, since the LPHF format induces a level of com-
petition on the price that is higher than the level of competition induced
by the HFLP auction, the expected consumer surplus gain E(S1) ￿ E(S0)
exceeds the fall in expected government revenue E(R1) ￿ E(R0).
Remark 1 If the volatility of the demand increases, the level of competition
increases, or ￿rms￿heterogeneity increases, the LPHF format tends to out-
16perform the HFLP format, provided the concessionaire is allowed to optimally
decide the investment timing.
4.3 Demand elasticity
Since infrastructure services often exhibit a very low demand elasticity, our
analysis has been carried out by assuming an inelastic demand. With a
downward sloping demand curve, it seems plausible that the expected welfare
bene￿ts arising from awarding contract which gives the franchisee the right
to decide when to operate the service tend to drop as the elasticity of demand
increases.
For instance, since an increase in elasticity makes the pro￿t function
"more concave" in the price, ￿rms will become more risk-averse (Spulberg,
1995). This causes an increase in equilibrium bids (Krishna, 2002) which,
under the LPHF auction, takes on the form of a decrease in equilibrium
prices involving an increase in the expected consumer surplus which is likely
to more than compensate for the fall in public revenue.
Although the price competition generated by a downward sloping demand
curve is present whether the contract allows or rules out investment time
￿ exibility, the price reduction tends to be more marked in the second case
since the managerial ￿ exibility lessens the e⁄ects of risk aversion. Put another
way, if the contract rules out any time ￿ exibility, ￿rms will be induced to
bid more aggressively in order to "buy" insurance against the possibility of
losing the franchise.
Remark 2 An increase in demand elasticity tends to reduce the potential
welfare gains arising from awarding a concession which allows the winning
bidder to optimally decide the investment time.
5 Final remarks
Concession arrangements and award procedures can take di⁄erent forms and
entail various legal and economic issues. In this paper we have focussed on
the e⁄ects of bidding rules, by comparing the outcome of two sealed-auction
formats which approximate actual practices:
￿ the concession is awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the lowest price charged
to consumers; should two or more ￿rms report the same price, the
17franchise will be awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the highest fee for the
lease (LPHF format)
￿ the concession is awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the highest fee; should
two or more ￿rms report the same payment, the franchise will be
awarded to the bidder o⁄ering the lowest price (HFLP format).
Our ￿ndings suggest that the choice between these auction formats can
have a de￿nitive e⁄ect on the price charged to consumers and the concession
fee when the conceding authority gives the winning bidder the right to under-
take the investment required to roll-out the service at a date of his choosing.
By contrast, when the government imposes the obligation to immediately
operate the service, the outcome of the award process is not a⁄ected by the
bidding rule.
Another issue addressed in this paper is the e⁄ect of time ￿ exibility on the
expected social value. Although the e⁄ect is not univocal, the analysis has
shown that when the volatility of the demand increases, the number of com-
petitors increases, or the ￿rms￿heterogeneity increases, a contract allowing
the franchisee to optimally decide the investment timing tends to outper-
form concession arrangements which transfer all risks to the concessionaire,
by ruling out investment time ￿ exibility.
However, in order to capture these potential welfare bene￿ts, the con-
tracts which give the option to delay the investment should be awarded by
using a bidding rule which emphasizes the price charged to consumers rather
than the fee paid to the government (LPHF format). For instance, if the
option-to-delay were awarded via the HFLP format, ￿rms would report the
same two-dimensional bid which they would have reported if the conceding
authority had imposed the obligation to immediately operate the service. In
other words, the HFLP format would annul the e⁄ects of the greater com-
petitive pressure deriving from the awarding of a contract which does not
restrict the managerial autonomy of the franchisee.
18Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
Assumptions 3 and 4 allow us to write the time evolution of demand as:
% y
+




t = (1 ￿ d)ty0 with probability 1 ￿ q
for all t ￿ 0 (19)
The ￿ ow of pro￿ts that the concessionaire will receive once the investment is
undertaken is simply:
￿(yt) = pyt for all t ￿ 0 (20)








t = (1 ￿ d)tpy0 with probability 1 ￿ q
(21)



















￿+dpy0 with probability 1 ￿ q
for all t ￿ 0
(22)
with ￿ ￿ u > 0. Referring to (21) and (22), the project￿ s Net Present Value











py0 ￿ I (23)
from which it is easy to get the expression in the text:
NPV
0 = (p ￿ ~ p)K0
where ~ p ￿ I
K0 and K0 ￿
h
1 + q 1+u
￿￿u + (1 ￿ q)1￿d
￿+d
i
y0. This concludes the
proof.
19B Proof of Lemma 2
As stated, if the ￿rm is able to postpone the investment decision of one
period, NPV 0 > 0 no longer constitutes a condition for immediately building
the new infrastructure. As a result, in evaluating the NPV at time zero the
￿rm has to consider this option value that must be included as part of the
total cost of the investment. Operatively, the ￿rm will compare the NPV 0















































If NPV 1￿NPV 0 > 0 it is optimal to wait one period and decide to invest at
t = 1 only in the case of good news. If, on the contrary, NPV 1￿NPV 0 < 0
it is optimal to invest at t = 0. Then, by imposing NPV 0(^ p) = NPV 1(^ p);
(26) can be rewritten as follows:
OP
0 = max[(^ p ￿ p)K1;0] (27)




K1 and K1 ￿
h
1 + (1 ￿ q)1￿d
￿+d
i
y0. Substituting (27) back




0 ￿ (p ￿ ~ p)K0 + max[(^ p ￿ p)K1;0]
This concludes the proof.
C Proof of Lemma 3
Before proving the Lemma let￿ s formally set the problem. Consider the bid-
ding decision of the ￿rm i and suppose that all other ￿rms use the symmetric
20strategy (p(~ pj) R0(~ pj)) 8j 6= i that speci￿es every bidder￿ s willingness to pay.
Further, let Hi(pi;R0
i) denote the probability that ￿rm i will win the auc-
tion with the two-dimensional bid (pi;R0








































where k is the number of other bidders that bid exactly (pi;R0
i): The ￿rst
term on the r.h.s. of (28) comes from events in which the ￿rm i is the outright
winner. The second term comes from events in which there is more than one
￿rm that bids pi and ties are resolved according to a second bid on the fee.
Then, according to the tie-breaking rule, the ￿rm i is the winner if it reports
the highest fee R0
i: Finally, if there is still more than one ￿rm that bids the
same (pi;R0
i); the winner is determined randomly from among those with the
highest bid.
A bid (pi;R0
i) is a best response at ~ pi (i.e. Ii) by the ￿rm i if it maximizes
its expected payo⁄ against the rivals￿strategies (p(~ pj);R0(~ pj);8j 6= i), that
is, if for any feasible bid (p;R0) we get:
￿
NPV















Note that if p(~ pj) is a strictly monotone increasing function and R0(~ pj) a
strictly monotone decreasing function, then Hi(pi;R0
i) is strictly increasing
in the two arguments.
We solve the problem by exploting the invariance result established by
Jackson and Swinkels (2004). The invariance result states that: 1) if a bid-
ding strategy forms an equilibrium for one "omniscient" tie-breaking rule,
it remains an equilibrium for any other trade-maximizing omniscient tie-
breaking rule; 2) if a player has an improving deviation relative to some
bidding strategy and tie-breaking rule, then there is a slight modi￿cation of
the deviation strategy which is still improving but which in addition allows
the player to avoid ties (Theorem 3 p. 24).
Since bidders prefer to avoid ties and the tie-breaking rules are not im-
portant in establishing the existence of the bidding equilibrium, the problem
can be splitted into two sub-problems. First, we determine the pricing rule






p(~ pj) ￿ pi
￿
(29)
Second, since in the case of a positive probability of having a tie the players
will strictly bene￿t by reporting a positive fee, conditionally on pi(~ pi); we




















Let￿ s begin with (29). We show that a price strategy for ￿rm i is a
symmetric function p(~ pi) mapping from the set of ￿rm types ￿ P = [0; ~ pu] to the
set of possible prices P ￿ R+:Yet, for each ￿rm i this function is continuously
di⁄erentiable and strictly increasing with the property that p0(~ pi) < 1 and
p(~ pu) = ~ pu.
Let￿ s assume that each bidder makes rational conjectures about the dis-
tribution of the rivals￿prices represented by a common distribution function
F(p); which is strictly increasing on the interval P ￿ R+, and the hazard
rate h(p) ￿
f(p)
1￿F(p) is increasing in p. This assumption allows de￿nition of
F (N￿1)(pi) ￿ 1￿(1￿F(pi))N￿1 as the cumulative distribution (with density
f(N￿1)(pi)) of the minimum of the N ￿ 1 rivals￿price, i.e. the probability
that all the other bidders set lower tari⁄s than i on the same support P. We
can then write the ￿rm i ￿ s expected payo⁄ (29) as:
(pi ￿ ~ pi)K0(1 ￿ F(pi))
N￿1 (31)
Maximizing (31) with respect to pi yields the necessary condition:
(1 ￿ F(pi))
N￿1[1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)(pi ￿ ~ pi)h(pi)] = 0
from which we get:




By the assumption h0(pi) > 0 the second order condition is always satis￿ed,
i.e.: ￿(pi ￿ ~ pi)h0(pi) ￿ h(pi) < 0:
Since the costs are uniformly distributed on I = [0;Iu]; also ~ pi are distrib-
uted uniformly within the support ￿ P = [0; ~ pu]: Furthermore, the less e¢ cient
￿rm knows for certain that it will lose the auction, then h(p) ! 1 and from
22(32) we get pi ! ~ pu : i.e. the ￿rm has a project value that is too low to win
and then ￿xes as price p = ~ pu. Finally,
dpi




> 0 and < 1:
So far we have assumed that Ii (i.e. ~ pi) is private information, but used
the distribution F(:) over the rivals￿price strategies to derive the ￿rm i
optimal price. To characterize the link between the distribution of Ii (~ pi)
and the ￿rm￿ s conjecture on output prices we impose:





This is a problem of statistical inference. We need to ensure that the func-
tion pi(:) of the random variable Ii (i.e. ~ pi) is itself a random variable and
to induce the distribution of pi from the distribution of Ii (i.e. ~ pi). This
procedure is an example of the distributional strategies approach introduced
by Milgrom and Weber (1985). Since the investment costs are uniformly



















~ pu ￿ ~ pi
By (32):
(~ p






￿ (N ￿ 1)(pi ￿ ~ pi) (34)




u ￿ ~ pi) ￿ p(~ p)(N ￿ 1) + ~ p(N ￿ 1) = 0 (35)
with the boundary condition that p(~ pu) = ~ pu: By the linearity of (35) we can
try a solution of type:
p(~ p) = A~ p + B (36)
Substituting (36) in (35) and rearranging we obtain :
A(~ p
u ￿ ~ pi) ￿ (A~ p + B)(N ￿ 1) + ~ p(N ￿ 1) = 0
[￿A ￿ A(N ￿ 1) + (N ￿ 1)]~ p + A~ p
u ￿ B(N ￿ 1) = 0
23from which, de￿ning A = N￿1
N and B =
~ pu
N ; we get:








This proves the ￿rst part of the proposition.
Let￿ s now turn to the second sub-problem. Since the ￿rms know in ad-
vance that in the event of a tie the regulator will break the tie basing on the
reported fee, it is a dominant strategy for all ￿rms to o⁄er the highest fee
in order not to increase the rivals￿probability of winning. Substituting (37)








u ￿ ~ pi)K0 (38)
From (38) the weakest ￿rm does not give any value to the project, i.e.
NPV 0
l ￿ 1
N(~ pu ￿ ~ pu)K0 = 0. Since the thresholds ~ pi are distributed uni-
formly within ￿ P= [0; ~ pu]; the bidding problem becomes equivalent to the
case where each bidder i assigns a value to the project which is also distrib-
uted uniformly over the interval [0;NPV 0
u ]. The equilibrium strategy form






















u ￿ p(~ pi)]K0
This concludes the proof of the Lemma.
D Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2 it is su¢ cient to show that by reversing the proof of
Lemma 3, we get the same result. Let￿ s ￿rst assume that there is a symmetric
price rule p : [0; ~ pu] ! [0;pu] which is strictly increasing with p0(~ pi) < 1 and
boundary condition p(~ pu) = ~ pu: By (1), the project value can be expressed as
NPV 0(~ pi) ￿ (p(~ pi)￿ ~ pi)K0; where NPV 0 : [0; ~ pu] ! [NPV 0
u ;0] is a strictly
decreasing function.
Let￿ s now consider the bidding decision of ￿rm i. Assuming that all
other ￿rms use a strictly monotone decreasing bid function R0(~ pi) : [0; ~ pu] !
24[R0(0);R0(~ pu)] 8i that speci￿es every bidder￿ s willingness to pay, the ￿rm i￿ s

















Since R0(~ pi) is monotone in [0; ~ pu]; the probability of winning when bid-
ding the amount R0
i against rivals who play the strategy R0(~ pj); j 6= i is
PrfR0(~ pj) ￿ R0
i) 8j 6= ig = Pr(R0￿1(R0





: That is, since R0(~ pi) is one-to-one in [0; ~ pu]; choosing a bid in
[R0(0);R0(~ pu)] is equivalent to choosing a ~ pi in [0; ~ pu]: We can then write the









from which it is deduced that NPV 0(~ pi) ￿ R0(~ pi) must be non-negative to
guarantee a positive expected payo⁄ (otherwise winning the auction would
be unpro￿table). Let￿ s suppose that bidder i submits a bid R0(￿ pi) when his
or her true trigger is ~ pi. Maximizing (39) with respect to ￿ pi and imposing
the truth-telling condition ￿ pi = ~ pi yields the necessary condition:
0 =
@U(￿ pi; ~ pi)
@￿ pi











By (40), the maximization problem can be reduced to the following ￿rst-order
linear di⁄erential equation:
R
00(~ pi)(1 ￿ G
(N￿1)(~ pi)) = ￿
￿
NPV





and rearranging we get: NPV 0(~ pi)d(1￿G(N￿1)(~ pi)) = R00(~ pi)(1￿G(N￿1)(~ pi))￿
R0(~ pi)g(N￿1)(~ pi) ￿ dR0(~ pi)(1 ￿ G(N￿1)(~ pi)). Since G(N￿1)(~ pu) = 1, integra-
tion yields:
￿R














(~ pu ￿ y)N￿2
(~ pu ￿ ~ pi)N￿1dy for any ~ pi < ~ p
u
25By standard arguments, it easy to show that if the bidder i￿ s private trigger is
equal to the upper value ~ pu, his or her bid must be equal to the current value
of the project, i.e. R0(~ pu) = NPV 0(~ pu) = 0: This makes zero expected pro￿t
for the worst bidder and ensures that the proposed equilibrium is unique in
[0; ~ pu] (Krishna, 2002, p. 17). Furthermore, di⁄erentiating (41) with respect






(~ pu ￿ ~ pi)
￿
R
0(~ pi) ￿ NPV
0(~ pi)
￿
< 0 for all ~ pi 2 [0; ~ p
u)(42)
and by continuity for ~ pi = ~ pu as well. Finally, the monotonicity of NPV 0(~ pi)
also assures the su¢ ciency of (40).
So far we have assumed the existence of the price rule p(~ pi) and its prop-
erties. However it can be easily derived on the lines of Lemma 3. It is useful
to note that since p(~ pi) is one-to-one in [0; ~ pu]; choosing a price pi in [0;pu] is
equivalent to choosing a trigger ~ pi in [0; ~ pu]: Then the bidder i￿ s direct utility
function (under the truth-telling condition) can be written as:
U(~ pi) ￿
￿












where F(pi) = G(~ pi) stands for the ￿rm i rational conjecture about the
distribution of the rivals￿prices. For any R0(~ pi) < (pi ￿ ~ pi)K0; the ￿rm will
maximize (43) by choosing pi such that the expected revenue (pi￿ ~ pi)K0(1￿
F (N￿1)(pi)) is maximum. Thus, Lemma 3 con￿rms that p(~ pi) is linear in ~ pi
with p0(~ pi) < 1 and p(~ pu) = ~ pu: This concludes the proof.
E Proof of Proposition 3
To prove this proposition we follow Che (1993, Proposition 2). The ￿rst step
is to show that under the ￿rst-score auction the price is chosen independently













= K0 ￿ (N ￿ 1)
(pi ￿ ~ pi)
(~ pu ￿ pi)
K0
= [1 ￿ (N ￿ 1)(pi ￿ ~ pi)h(pi)]K0
26h(pi) = 1
(~ pu￿pi) is equal to zero if pi = p(~ pi) as in (7), the scoring rule is able
to implement the optimal bid.
To do this it is su¢ cient to show that for any couple of bids that give the
same score, the one that contains the price pi always outperforms the other.








i 6= pi; p0









: It is easy to show that the







































Although the two bids give the same score, the expected pro￿t of (p0
i;R00
i ) is





















































































where the last inequality follows from (44). Next, since the price is chosen
independently from the score, substituting pi = p(~ pi) we can rewrite the





















which is equivalent to (39). The optimal fee then follows in the usual way.
This concludes the proof.
F Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 can be proved following the proof of Lemma 3. The pricing rule
is obtained by maximizing the expected project value. In particular, each
bidder should maximize the project value as de￿ned in (4):
12See Che (1993, p. 678) for a formal proof that Pr(win; s0(p0
i;R00












fmax[(pi ￿ ~ pi)K0;(pi ￿ ￿ pi)(K0 ￿ K1)]g(1 ￿ F(pi))
N￿1:
The optimal price strategy is then given by:
p
option
i = min[p(~ pi);p(￿ pi)] (45)
where p(~ pi) is the price when the ￿rm maximizes the NPV 0
i and p(￿ pi) stands
for the price when it maximizes the NPV 1
i : Since Lemma 3 provides p(~ pi);
we need to derive the pricing rule that maximizes:
max
pi
[(pi ￿ ￿ pi)(K0 ￿ K1)](1 ￿ F(pi))
N￿1
The ￿rst order condition for this case is:
(1 ￿ F(pi))
N￿1[(K0 ￿ K1) ￿ (N ￿ 1)[(pi ￿ ~ pi)K0 + (^ pi ￿ pi)K1]h(pi)] = 0











= ￿ pi +
1
(N ￿ 1)h(pi)
Since h0(pi) > 0; the second order condition is always satis￿ed; i.e.: ￿[(pi ￿
~ pi)K0 + (^ pi ￿ pi)K1]h0(pi) ￿ (K0 ￿ K1)h(pi) < 0: As the costs are uniformly
distributed on I = [0;Iu] also ￿ pi are distributed uniformly in ﬂ P = [0; ￿ pu]: The
￿rm with ￿ pu has a project value that is too low to win, i.e. the less e¢ cient
￿rm knows for certain that it will lose the auction, then h(p) ! 1 and from
(46) pi ! ￿ pu:Finally, we get
dpi




> 0 and < 1:
Simple veri￿cation shows that from (33) we obtain a ￿rst order di⁄erential
equation in p(￿ p) similar to (35), from which it is easy to get the price rule








u ￿ ￿ pi)(K0 ￿ K1) (47)
28which is also distributed uniformly in [0;NPV 1
u ], with NPV 1
l ￿ 1
N(￿ pu ￿
￿ pu)(K0 ￿ K1) = 0: It follows that the bidding equilibrium strategy requires























Finally, recalling that by assumption 5 we get ￿ pi ￿ ~ pi ￿ ^ pi, the following








u + (1 ￿ ￿)^ p



































dominant strategy for each ￿rm. This concludes the proof.
G Proof of Lemma 5
Let￿ s ￿rst consider the expected revenue. De￿ning Vi = max[NPV 0
i ;NPV 1
i ];
the bidder i￿ s expected payment is given by:







The regulator earns from each bidder an expected payment E(Ri): Since he
























from which we get:

































Let￿ s now turn to the consumers￿surplus. We need to distinguish between
the HFLP and the LPHF format. Indicating the surplus for the ￿rst and

























(1 + ￿)tE(yt) = (p
























max ￿ pi(￿ pi))qYuy0 = (p
max ￿ pi(￿ pi))(K0 ￿ K1)













































































Finally, by (49) and (50), the di⁄erence between the welfare value resulting
from the LPHF auction format and the welfare value resulting from the


























This concludes the proof.
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